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Introduction
Integrated reporting has evolved quite rapidly in South Africa since 2010, leading to the release of 
the world’s first International Integrated Reporting Framework at the end of 2013. South Africa 
has contributed significantly to the development of integrated reporting worldwide, starting with 
the establishment of the King Commission by Nelson Mandela and Professor Mervyn King. The 
King report has grown from a report disclosing a balanced overview of the business to one defined 
as ‘a holistic and integrated representation of the entity’s performance in terms of both its finance 
and stability’ (Druckman 2013). Professor Mervyn King has also contributed to integrated 
reporting on a global basis as chairman of the International Integrated Reporting Council, 
promoting the adoption of integrated reporting by businesses worldwide.
Since 2010, Ernst & Young (EY) South Africa has given all listed and state-owned South African 
entities the opportunity to have their integrated reports analysed to improve the quality of these 
reports in the future (Ernst & Young 2013, 2014, 2015). The annual EY Excellence in Integrated 
Reporting Survey is realised as a result of this opportunity, where the top 100 entities as listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) are evaluated (with reference to their market capitalisation) 
based on their integrated reports (Ernst & Young 2013, 2014, 2015). The entities’ integrated 
reports were ranked as ‘Excellent’, ‘Good’, ‘Average’ or ‘Progress to be made’, and the top 10 
entities in the ‘Excellent’ category were also identified to enable a separate discussion of their 
reports (Ernst & Young 2013, 2014, 2015).
This study carried out an empirical evaluation of the firm characteristics of the entities that 
produced an ‘Excellent’ report, as well as the entities that produced a report where progress can 
be made in the future. This study, therefore, made the following contribution to the accounting 
literature: Stakeholders are interested in obtaining sufficient information from an entity’s 
integrated report to facilitate efficient decision-making. Our evidence will assist current and 
Background: Integrated reporting has attracted much attention in the past few years, and 
South Africa has taken the lead in its development worldwide. An annual survey is published 
by Ernst & Young regarding the quality of the integrated reports of the top 100 entities listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
Aim: The study on which this article is based was aimed at determining whether the assessment 
of an entity’s characteristics can predetermine the quality of the integrated report generated by 
that entity.
Setting: This article focuses on an analysis of the integrated reporting of the top 100 entities 
listed on JSE for the financial years ending in 2013, 2014 and 2015.
Methods: Comparison of categorical variables, mixed-model repeated measures ANOVA and 
generalised estimating equations were applied to identify the best classificators to distinguish 
between excellent integrated reporting and those reports where progress could still be made.
Results: The results show that the type of industry the entity finds itself in, the size and 
profitability of the entity, as well as the composition of the members of the board, have an 
effect on the quality of the integrated report.
Conclusion: Our results indicated that the type of industry, size of an entity, the profitability 
and composition of the board of directors, all have an effect on the quality of the integrated 
reporting. Our evidence will assist current and prospective stakeholders in evaluating the 
expected quality of an entity’s integrated report, through the evaluation of certain firm 
characteristics.
Firm characteristics and excellence in integrated 
reporting
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prospective stakeholders in evaluating the expected quality 
of an entity’s integrated report, through the evaluation of 
certain firm characteristics.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the 
assessment of an entity’s characteristics such as entity size, 
profitability, generation of cash flow and number of directors 
can predetermine the quality of the integrated report 
generated by that entity.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: ‘Literature 
review’ section provides a critical overview of previous 
literature regarding integrated reporting in the industry, as 
well as a description of the different entity characteristics 
evaluated in the study. ‘Research methodology’ section 
focuses on the research methodology of the study, followed 
by a discussion of the findings in ‘Results’ section. In 
‘Conclusion’ section, the final section, some conclusions are 
offered.
Literature review
Integrated reporting
We find ourselves living in a day and age where large entities 
dictate important and often crucial facets of our daily lives. 
Big supermarkets dictate, directly or indirectly, our eating 
habits with premiums on select foods. Corporate infrastructure 
giants dictate our lives by supplying ‘necessities’ such as 
electricity and communication. One might even go so far 
as to say that such corporations dictate what society deems 
acceptable through their use of social and other media 
(Eccles & Armbrester 2011).
The question is: What guides these corporations to lead us in 
a certain direction? Many believe that the boards of major 
entities are stakeholder-driven. Academics and commentators 
may still be arguing about what constitutes a stakeholder. A 
further question might be whether a ‘Stakeholder Approach’ 
is feasible. Should we rather say that management is focused 
on ‘Stakeholder Return’ (Scholes & Clutterbuck 1998)? This 
begs the question: How do we as users prevent corporates 
from trading without morals and values?
In recent years, the focus has shifted to reporting. Increasingly, 
markets around the world are focusing their accountability 
on more detailed disclosures. On the forefront of these 
disclosures is the principle of integrated reporting. Many 
economic pundits believe that for an entity to be sustainable, 
one can not only focus on financial disclosures or only 
disclose information needed by financial stakeholders. It is 
rather believed that sustainability requires disclosure of a 
much broader spectrum of information.
A country taking the lead in this regard is South Africa. 
Through the King Commission, headed by Professor Mervyn 
King, South Africa has been focusing heavily on this type of 
reporting. The first report presented by the King Commission 
is known today as the King I report. The findings in this 
report led to further investigations, upon which the King II 
and finally the King III report were published in 2009. The 
King III report does not constitute legislation, but rather 
encourages entities to make use of good integrated reporting. 
The findings in the King III report focus mainly on maximising 
shareholder information and providing disclosure to enable 
a user to obtain a better understanding of the entity as a 
whole.
Integrated reporting attempts to reveal the relationship 
between financial and non-financial performance and how 
these interrelated dimensions create or destroy value for 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa, IoDSA 2009).
Firm characteristics
Firm size
Kansal, Joshi and Batra (2014) stated that larger entities need 
to disclose more because they receive more attention from 
the general public, undertake more activities and make a 
greater impact on society, and therefore need to exhibit 
greater social responsibility and improve their corporate 
image due to their higher visibility. Larger entities also 
experience more pressure from various stakeholder groups 
to disclose their social activities. It can be expected that the 
entity size will have an influence on the corporate social 
responsibility disclosure, which forms part of the integrated 
report. It was found that larger entities disclose corporate 
social responsibility information to a greater extent than 
smaller entities (Aras, Aybars & Kutlu 2010; Hossain & Reaz 
2007; Kansal et al. 2014; Siregar & Bachtiar 2010).
Firm size can be represented by total assets, net sales or 
market capitalisation. These three measures have been used 
in numerous previous studies to determine the associational 
relationship between corporate size and the level of disclosure 
in corporate annual reports (Wallace & Naser 1995). It is also 
noted that market capitalisation represents an externally 
determined measure of an entity’s importance as seen by the 
investing public, whereas asset size and sales are internally 
determined measures.
The following hypotheses were tested in order to determine 
the prevailing situation in South Africa during the period 
under examination:
H1a: Entities with a higher level of revenue can be expected to 
deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than entities with 
a lower level of revenue.
H1b: Entities with a higher level of net assets can be expected to 
deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than entities with 
a lower level of net assets.
H1c: Entities with a higher level of market capitalisation can be 
expected to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than 
entities with a lower level of market capitalisation.
Growth
It is expected that entities with greater growth opportunities 
tend to disclose more information than entities with lower 
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growth opportunities (Murcia & dos Santos 2012). Entities 
that have greater growth opportunities are likely to need 
resources in the near future. These entities tend to adopt 
better corporate governance mechanisms, through better 
disclosure practices, to be more transparent for better investor 
protection. Entities with good growth opportunities that 
need to raise external financing will improve their governance 
mechanisms as better governance and minority shareholder 
protection will be likely to lower their costs of capital 
(Khancel 2007). Consequently, investors would be more 
likely to finance these types of entities.
The following hypothesis was tested in order to determine 
the prevailing situation in South Africa during the period 
under examination:
H2: The quality of the integrated report of entities with a higher 
growth rate can be expected to deliver more excellence in 
integrated reporting than entities with a lower growth rate.
Profitability
It is expected from the signalling theory that where entity 
performance, measured by profitability (profit after tax) and 
return on investments, is good, entities would wish to signal 
their quality to investors (Watson, Shrives & Marston 2002). 
It is therefore expected that the entity performance would be 
an important determinant of ratio disclosure. Entities with 
high profitability disclose more information than those with 
lower returns. It may also be argued that entities performing 
poorly may disclose less information to conceal their 
performance from stakeholders.
This view is emphasised by Inchausti (1997) from the 
perspective of the agency theory that management of a very 
profitable entity will use information in order to obtain 
personal advantages. Therefore, management will disclose 
detailed information as a means of justifying their position 
and compensation package (Singhvi & Desai 1971).
Khlif and Souissi (2010) found that higher performance 
allows managers to be more convincing to shareholders of 
their superior managerial abilities. Therefore, by disclosing 
more information, managers can obtain higher degrees 
of confidence from investors. Better performance allows 
managers to distinguish themselves and their entities in the 
labour and stock markets. This is confirmed by Singhvi and 
Desai (1971) who revealed that profit margins and earnings 
returns are variables that both have a positive association 
with the extent of corporate disclosure.
Ng and Koh (1994) argued that more profitable entities will 
be subject to greater public scrutiny and will therefore apply 
self-regulation mechanisms, such as voluntary disclosures in 
an attempt to avoid external regulation.
The following hypothesis was therefore tested:
H3: The quality of entities with a higher profit margin can be 
expected to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than 
entities with a lower profit margin.
Generation of cash flow
The ability of an entity to meet its short-term financial 
obligations without having to liquidate or cease operations is 
important for interested parties such as investors, lenders 
and regulatory authorities in the evaluation of an entity, 
because the inability of an entity to meet its current obligations 
may lead to bankruptcy (Wallace & Naser 1995). Entities 
therefore tend to give more detail in their annual reports 
about their ability to meet financial obligations as they fall 
due and about the fact that the entity is a going concern, in 
order to relieve the fears of interested parties. It is expected 
that a highly liquid entity is most likely to provide more 
information (Watson et al. 2002).
The cash-generating ability of the entity plays an immense 
role in the liquidity of the entity. The entity with the better 
cash-generating ability can be measured in two ways: firstly, 
as the entity with the ability to generate higher cash flow 
from operating activities relative to revenue, and secondly, as 
the entity that succeeds in transforming its profit into cash. 
The more liquid entity will be in a better financial position to 
allocate resources to the preparation of useful integrated 
reports.
The following hypotheses were therefore tested:
H4a: The quality of entities with a higher cash inflow from 
operating activities as a percentage to revenue can be expected to 
deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than entities with 
a lower cash inflow.
H4b: The quality of entities with a higher cash inflow from 
operating activities as a percentage to net assets can be expected 
to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting than entities 
with a lower cash inflow.
H4c: The quality of entities with a higher transformation of 
profits into cash can be expected to deliver more excellence in 
integrated reporting than entities with a lower cash inflow.
Governance
Entity governance has long been a topic of interest, and the 
impact of corporate governance is still largely unknown 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013a). Prior studies have found that 
there are two large categories of corporate governance that 
have an effect on disclosure decisions, namely ownership 
structures and the board composition (Fifka 2011).
The disclosure of South African entities is largely affected by 
their ownership (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013b; Ntim, Opong & 
Danbolt 2012a). Studies have found that depending on the 
shareholder make-up of an entity, the entity will choose 
different disclosure strategies. There should be a clear 
distinction between institutional, government and block 
shareholders (Eng & Mak 2003). Larger shareholders (such 
as block holders and institutional holders) can be expected 
to have larger managerial monitoring and to strive for less 
information asymmetry. They would therefore require more 
voluntary disclosure. Entities with government shareholding 
(for example the Public Investment Corporation) have 
access to resources and information other entities might not 
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have, but also have the risk of increased political cost. One 
could therefore expect that entities with government 
shareholding disclose more information voluntarily (Ntim 
et al. 2012b).
Larger boards are seen to be less cohesive, and it could be 
expected that these entities have lower quality disclosure 
as there are no clear reporting structures or communication 
channels. On the contrary, larger boards will have increased 
managerial power and might increase the focus on 
reporting as the number of executive members on the board 
is increased. South Africa has a unique corporate environment, 
and one, therefore, needs to consider characteristics 
of the environment that might influence the disclosure 
decisions, such as duel leadership entities (separate 
CEO and chairperson of the board of directors) and 
directors of colour (Ntim & Soobaroyen 2013b). Entities in 
South Africa are mandated to improve the number of 
previously disadvantaged individuals employed by them 
in management, as well as develop these individuals’ skills. 
This is largely referred to as black economic empowerment 
(BEE). It would therefore be expected that entities with 
higher BEE levels (directors of colour and female directors) 
relating their board would disclose more voluntarily in an 
attempt to be more transparent and legitimate.
The following hypotheses were therefore tested:
H5a: Entities with a block/institutional or governmental 
investment can be expected to deliver more excellence in 
integrated reporting than entities that do not possess this type of 
investment.
H5b: Entities with more members on their board of directors can 
be expected to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting 
than entities that have fewer members on their board.
H5c: Entities with more BEE-driven directors (female directors 
and directors of colour) can be expected to deliver more 
excellence in integrated reporting than other entities.
Research methodology
Dependent variables
The EY Excellence in Integrated Reporting Awards survey 
was selected for the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. This survey 
ranked the top 100 entities based on their market capitalisation 
at 31 December of each year. Due to the ranking based on 
the market capitalisation, the entities included in the 3-year 
period may vary. The top 100 entities are supposedly the 
larger entities listed in South Africa and account for 
approximately 94% of the total market capital, but there is 
still quite a large difference in the size of these 100 entities. 
Entities from all sectors were included in the EY survey, but 
pure holding companies were excluded.
Each of the integrated reports of the entities was given a 
separate mark, according to a pre-determined mark plan. 
The mark plan included specific aspects that should be 
present in an integrated report (Ernst & Young 2013, 2014, 
2015), and a mark was given for each of the International 
Integrated Reporting Council’s five guiding principles, 
namely strategic focus, connectivity of information, future 
orientation, responsiveness and stakeholder inclusiveness, 
and the conciseness, reliability and materiality of the 
information. In explaining the marking process, it was 
emphasised by the authors that the quality of information 
presented was important by stating: ‘crisply presented 
information that highlights relevant facts was given more 
credit than the same information needed to be extracted 
from less relevant information’ (Ernst & Young 2013, 2014, 
2015).
A final ranking was awarded to the entities based on the 
average of the adjudicators’ marks. Large variations in the 
marks were examined in order to make sure that nothing 
had been omitted. The adjudication process culminated in 
each entity’s integrated report being classified into one of 
the four groups: ‘Excellent’, ‘Good’, ‘Average’ and ‘Progress 
to be made’. Although the adjudicators acknowledged that 
the degree of subjectivity involved in marking could lead to 
a different ranking, the conclusion reached stated that there 
was a clear distinction between those entities with excellent 
integrated reporting and those where integrated reporting 
should be improved (Ernst & Young 2013).
Building on the above survey, this study accepted the 
conclusion reached with regard to detailed ranking that 
might differ as a result of subjectivity in the measuring 
instrument; however, the classification at the extremes of the 
classification outcomes, Excellent (EXC) and Progress to be 
made (PTBM), should be clear. The outcome of the 
classification of the integrated reports, as being either EXC or 
PTBM, was therefore used in this study as the dependent 
variable.
Independent variables
The independent variables that were tested in this study 
were selected from previous studies performed on 
disclosure of information in annual reports of entities as 
discussed in ‘Firm characteristics’ section. The values of 
these independent variables were taken from the annual 
reports of the individual entities that were in the EXC and 
PTBM categories as classified in the EY survey (Ernst & 
Young 2013). The annual reports of the previous year were 
selected for a specific EY survey, as the surveys were 
conducted on the previous year’s reports. The 2012 annual 
reports were therefore selected for the 2013 EY survey. The 
independent variables were not available in the EY survey. 
The descriptions of the independent variables are provided 
in Table 1.
Research design
Comparison of categorical variables (such as the mining 
sector) with integrated reporting was done using cross-
tabulation and the chi-square test. Mean scores of the 
continuous variables (e.g. revenue) were compared 
between the two groups using mixed-model repeated 
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measures ANOVA. Here the integrated reporting groups 
and year were treated as fixed effects and the companies as 
random effects. A generalised estimating equations analysis 
was conducted to test the combined influence of the 
continuous variables on the binary (yes/no) outcome of 
the integrated reporting variable. To further investigate the 
predictability of the binary integrated reporting variable by 
all the independent variables, a variable selection procedure 
was applied to select a subset of predictor variables that 
best predicted the binary outcome using discriminant 
analysis.
Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous 
variables of our test. In Table 2, it can be seen that approximately 
66% of the entities presented excellent integrated reporting. 
Of the entire sample of our tests, approximately 21% belonged 
to the mining industry, 18% to the financial industry and 
15% to property sector. When looking at the governance 
characteristics, it can be seen that 94% of the entities had a 
chairperson on the board that was not the CEO and therefore 
had dual leadership. Approximately, 59% of the entities had 
a chairperson who was a director of colour on the board and 
65% had the government as a shareholder.
Table 3 shows how the different variables influence the 
outcome of the integrated report. Of the mining entities 
represented in Table 3, 93% presented excellent integrated 
reporting, while only 58% of the non-mining entities 
presented excellent integrated reporting. This is in line 
with prior literature. As per Deegan and Gordon (1996), 
environmentally sensitive entities are entities that received 
greater attention from environmental lobby groups. The 
coefficient provides statistical significant evidence that the 
environmentally sensitive entities would more likely present 
excellent integrated reporting to legitimise their business. 
Only 50% of the entities in the financial sector had excellent 
reporting compared to 69% of those that do not in the 
financial sector. This is an indication that not all of the sectors 
are concerned with the quality of their integrated reporting. 
The results further indicated that only 36% of the property 
entities had excellent reporting, while 71% of the non-
property entities had excellent reporting. Consistent with 
prior literature, the results presented above indicate that 
environmentally sensitive sectors, like the mining sector in 
our sample, deliver integrated reports of excellent quality 
compared to the other sectors.
Based on the results of the corporate governance factors, it is 
evident that 54% of the entities with EXC integrated reporting 
had a chairperson of colour to lead the board of directors, 
while 83% of the entities with a chairperson who was not a 
person of colour had EXC reporting. This provides statistically 
significant evidence (p < 0.01) that the chairman of a company 
does have a role in the results of the integrated reporting and 
that a chairperson of colour does not necessarily improve the 
results of the integrated reporting. Contrary to what has been 
reported in earlier literature, no significant evidence was 
obtained when looking at the government as a shareholder of 
an entity.
Table 4 represents the results of the mixed-model repeated 
measures ANOVA. Based on the results, it can be seen in 
Table 4 that the entities with EXC reporting are larger with 
respect to greater revenue, net assets, market capitalisation 
and total assets to total liabilities than those in the PTBM 
category. This finding is consistent with the prior literature, 
which indicates that larger entities disclose more because 
they receive more attention from the general public, 
undertake more activities and make a greater impact on 
society. All of these aspects were highly significant. However, 
the EXC entities had a smaller growth rate than those with 
the PTBM rating. We therefore did not find that entities with 
TABLE 1: Description of independent variables.
Variable Description of independent variable
Size
 Log(Rev) Natural logarithm of the revenue for the year
 Log(A-L) Natural logarithm of the total assets minus total 
liabilities as at year-end
 Log(MC) Natural logarithm of the market capitalisation as at 
year-end
Growth Growth in revenue from 1 year to the next as a 
percentage
Profitability
 PAT/R Net profit for the year (excluding preference 
dividends) divided by the revenue for the year
 PAT/(TA-TL) Net profit for the year (excluding preference 
dividends) divided by the total assets less total 
liabilities for the year
Cash flow
 CFO/R Cash flows generated from operations (before 
dividend expense, but including dividend income) 
divided by the revenue for the year
 CFO/(TA-TL) Cash flows generated from operations (before 
dividend expense, but including dividend income) 
divided by the net assets as at year-end
 Cash Gen Cash flows generated from operations (before 
dividend expense, but including dividend income) 
divided by the net profit for the year (excluding 
preference dividends)
Governance
 Females on board The number of female directors
 Executives The number of executive members on the board of 
directors
 Dir of colour The number of directors of colour
 Size The number of directors on the board of directors
 Non-public/public The number of private shareholders divided by the 
number of public investors
 Dual leadership 1 If the CEO and chairperson of the board are 
different people, 0 otherwise
 Chairperson of colour 1 if the chairperson of the board is a director of 
colour, 0 otherwise
 Government as shareholder 1 if the government has shareholding in the entity, 
0 otherwise
Industry We looked at the mining, property and finance 
sectors
TABLE 2: Classification of the entities.
Variable Number of observations 
where the result is no
Number of observations 
where the result is yes
Number % Number %
Excellent reporting 49 34 94 66
Mining sector 113 79 30 21
Financial sector 117 82 26 18
Property sector 121 85 22 15
Dual leadership 8 6 135 94
Chairperson of colour 58 41 85 59
Government as shareholder 47 35 86 65
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greater growth opportunities tend to disclose more 
information than entities with lower growth opportunities.
Our results also found entities ranked as EXC might not be 
more profitable than those ranked as PTBM. Based on our 
sample over the 3-year period, it is evident that PTBM entities 
are significantly more profitable than those that fall in the 
EXC category. However, entities with excellent reporting do 
generate more cash flow as the cash flow variables in this 
category are greater compared to the entities in the PTBM 
category.
When looking at the corporate governance characteristics, 
it is evident that the entities in the EXC category have 
significantly more females and more directors of colour 
(black, Indian and coloured), with significantly less 
executive directors on their board. This finding is consistent 
with the results of earlier literature of Ntim and Sabooroyen 
(2013b). The size of the board was also slightly larger 
compared with the entities in the PTBM category, but the 
results were not significant. We found, however, that 
the entities delivering excellent integrated reporting had 
significantly fewer public shareholders than those in the 
PTBM category, which is inconsistent with findings in 
earlier literature.
The results of the generalised estimation equations (Table 5) 
revealed that the industry of the entities does have an effect 
on the quality of the integrated reporting as significant 
results were found for the entities in the mining and 
property industries. This suggests that entities in the 
mining industry are more likely to present excellent 
integrated reports. Entities in the property industry are, 
however, more likely to present integrated reports in the 
PTBM category as 85% of them were classified in that 
TABLE 3: Results of the categorised histogram.
Variable Excellent reporting
pNumber of observations with EXC reporting where the result is no for the variable
Number of observations with EXC reporting where the 
result is yes for the variable
Number % Number %
Mining sector 66 58 28 93 < 0.01***
Financial sector 81 69 13 50 0.07*
Property sector 86 71 8 36 < 0.01***
Chairperson of colour 48 83 46 54 < 0.01***
Government as shareholder 30 64 56 65 0.88
* and ***, indicate statistical significance at 0.10 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
TABLE 4: Results of the mixed-model repeated measures ANOVA.
Variable PTBM EXC
p
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard deviation
Log(Rev) 3.79 0.66 4.47 0.56 < 0.01***
Log(A-L) 4.04 0.49 4.41 0.62 < 0.01***
Log(MC) 4.35 0.46 4.72 0.53 < 0.01***
Growth 0.69 2.51 0.11 0.15 0.04**
PAT/R 0.63 1.09 0.15 0.22 < 0.01***
PAT/(TA-TL) 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.68
CFO/R 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.19 0.34
CFO/(TA-TL) 0.12 0.16 0.27 0.26 < 0.01***
Cash Gen 0.60 0.92 0.76 6.44 0.86
L:TA 0.36 0.20 0.51 0.24 < 0.01***
Females on board 0.11 0.11 0.21 0.07 < 0.01***
Executives 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.09 < 0.01***
Dir of colour 0.22 0.23 0.41 0.18 < 0.01***
Size 11.41 3.76 12.38 2.59 0.08*
Non-public/public 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.50 0.04**
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
TABLE 5: Results of the generalised estimation equations.
Variable Regression coefficients Model effects
Estimate Standard error Wald p
Mining sector 2.05 2.12 0.93 < 0.01***
Financial sector -6.64 2.04 10.55 0.21
Property company -5.66 1.79 10.02 < 0.01***
Chairperson of colour -2.26 1.44 2.45 < 0.01***
Government shareholder -1.46 1.10 1.77 0.74
AurAALog(Rev) 1.96 2.19 0.80 < 0.01***
Log(A-L) 6.59 2.67 6.12 0.96
Log(MC) -6.35 2.57 6.12 0.69
Growth -10.41 3.96 6.93 0.11
PAT/R -4.60 2.37 3.76 0.17
PAT/(TA-TL) 17.40 4.90 12.57 0.42
CFO/R 21.51 5.44 15.64 0.04*
CFO/(TA-TL) -5.61 3.54 2.52 0.16
Cash Gen -0.14 0.07 3.99 0.17
L:TA 9.62 2.66 13.06 < 0.01***
Females on board 16.68 5.86 8.11 < 0.01***
Executives -13.95 7.00 3.98 0.10
Dir of colour -5.44 3.71 2.14 0.09
Size 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.58
Non-public/public 7.52 2.88 6.80 0.01**
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tailed test.
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category. No significant results were obtained for the 
financial industry.
Entities that have chairmen of colour on their board are more 
likely to present excellent integrated reports. Significant 
results were obtained for only three of the financial indicators. 
Entities with larger revenue as well as those with larger total 
assets to liabilities are more likely to have excellent integrated 
reports. Significant results at a lower level were obtained for 
the cash flow generation of the entities.
With regard to the corporate governance characteristics, 
significant results were only obtained for the number of 
females on the board as well as the number of non-public 
shareholders. This is an indication that entities that have 
more females as well as non-public shareholders on their 
board are more likely to present excellent reporting.
Table 6 shows the variables selected by the variable selection 
procedure to best predict the binary integrated reporting 
variable. The general discriminant analysis (Table 6) provided 
significant results for all the selected variables except for 
growth. This is consistent with the results in the previous 
tables, which indicates that entities with excellent reporting 
are likely to have larger net assets, larger total assets to 
liabilities and larger cash flow generation to the net assets. 
This is also applicable to entities that have more directors of 
colour on their board.
Table 7 shows a summary of our results for each of the 
hypotheses developed in our study. Based on the summary 
of our hypotheses, we did not obtain significant results to 
indicate that the quality of entities with a higher cash inflow 
from operating activities as a percentage to revenue can be 
expected to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting 
than entities with a lower cash inflow and that the quality of 
entities with a higher transformation of profits into cash can 
be expected to deliver more excellence in integrated reporting 
than entities with a lower cash inflow.
Conclusion
The study reported in this article was conducted to determine 
whether the assessment of an entity’s characteristics, such as 
entity size, profitability, generation of cash flows and number 
of directors, can predetermine the quality of the integrated 
report generated by that entity.
Our investigation has shown that the type of industry an 
entity finds itself in does have an effect on the quality of the 
integrated report produced. Our results confirm that an 
entity whose business has an effect on the environment will 
produce a more detailed integrated report legitimising its 
business, compared with an entity that does not affect the 
environment.
When investigating the financial characteristics of an entity 
and their effect on the quality of the integrated report, it was 
seen that larger entities (determined by the revenue for the 
year, net assets, market capitalisation and total assets 
compared with total liabilities) have better resources to 
allocate to the integrated report and therefore produce a 
better report.
It was also found that entities that are more profitable tend to 
produce integrated reports that need progress to be made 
and that cash flow plays an important role in obtaining 
resources for the integrated reporting process, as those 
entities with greater cash flow tend to produce integrated 
reports of a higher quality.
Our results for the corporate governance characteristics 
showed that entities with more females and directors of 
colour provided better integrated reports than their 
counterparties. These entities also had fewer executive 
directors on their board. It was, however, interesting to note 
that the entities with less public shareholding had better 
integrated reports, which contradicts findings reported in 
earlier literature.
Our study experienced some limitations that should be 
considered. The entities we tested in our sample are only the 
entities which fell in the EXC or PTBM categories of the EY 
Excellence in Integrated Reporting Survey, thus limiting the 
number of industries that were tested to three: property, 
mining and financial. It also limited the number of entities 
used in our sample as there are two more categories (average 
and good), which also contain a large number of entities. 
These categories were, however, not considered.
It is suggested that future research flowing from this study 
could include a study on all the entities in the EY survey, 
covering all the categories mentioned above. More industries 
could also be included in the data, which might provide a 
clearer picture of the reporting style of different industries. 
TABLE 6: Results of the general discriminant analysis.
Effect Value F p
Intercept 0.69 56.42 0.00***
Growth 0.96 0.62 0.43
L_TA 0.96 5.26 0.02**
Log(A-L) 0.86 19.95 0.00***
CFO/(TA-TL) 0.92 10.63 0.00***
Dir of colour 0.88 16.83 0.00***
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using 
a two-tailed test.
TABLE 7: Summary of the results on our hypothesis.
Effect Value
H1a Accepted
H1b Accepted
H1c Accepted
H2 Accepted
H3 Accepted
H4a Rejected
H4b Accepted
H4c Rejected
H5a Accepted
H5b Accepted
H5c Accepted
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Future studies could also extend the variables used in this 
study to introduce a more holistic view of entities and their 
reporting styles. As integrated reporting becomes more 
prominent in our society, further research questions could 
include: How do stakeholders react to integrated reporting 
and the quality of the report itself? How is the decision-
making process of stakeholders affected when entities do not 
produce integrated reporting at all compared with situations 
where integrated reports are delivered – does the quality of 
the report have a significant impact in this instance? Since 
integrated reporting is still a relatively new area whose 
research has not yet been saturated, there is ample scope for 
future research.
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